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Abstract 
This paper aims to explore the issue of unintended consequences as the key 
underlying theme that explains the incremental integration of policies in the 
EU, with a particular focus on the issue of environmental protection. The 
theoretical background of the present research is provided by two of the main 
schools of thought that, in different historical contexts, have theorized 
unintended consequences as a relevant interpretative/analytical tool for 
European integration, namely neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism. The 
paper focuses on three distinctive moments of the EU environmental policy: 
the first steps in the 1970s, the change of regulatory paradigm during the 
1990s, and the EU leadership role in global environmental policy. The main 
argument is that while neo-functionalism can give a convincing account of the 
initial phases of EU environmental policy, neo-institutionalism offers a 
persuasive framework to understand the consolidation phases of the policy. 
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The Ascent of EU Environmental Policy: A Case 
for Unintended Consequences 
Federica Cittadino 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The history of European integration is also the story of the expansion of the 
EU field of action.1 From the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the pooling of national sovereignty has largely exceeded a 
purely economic pact. Along this path, the major treaty revisions do not only 
represent institutional tuning operations, so as to allow the machine to 
operate more smoothly or to ensure new power equilibria, but they also spell 
out the increasing number of EU competences. The extraordinary nature of 
European integration thus is due both to its unprecedented start (voluntary 
pact to achieve peace and stability) and to the dynamics of its deepening 
from an economic project to a community that encompasses numerous 
aspects of the life of its citizens. 
The incremental logic is nothing new in the project of the EU’s founding 
fathers Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. The former imagined integration to 
kick off from the institutionalized cooperation in limited technical, low-
politics sectors that do not impinge directly on the sovereign powers of states 
but create a de facto solidarity.2 This project had as its engine the logic of 
spill-over that will be illustrated in the following sections of this essay. 
Schuman is the author, together with Monnet himself, of the declaration that 
gave symbolically birth to the adventure of European integration. 
In this context, this paper aims to explore the issue of unintended 
consequences as the key underlying theme that explains the incremental 
integration of policies in the EU, with a particular focus on the issue of 
environmental protection. The theoretical background of the present 
research is provided by two of the main schools of thought that, in different 
historical contexts, have theorized unintended consequences as a relevant 
interpretative/analytical tool for European integration, namely neo-
 
 
1  The term “EU” is used in this essay to indicate in a general way the institutional result of European 
integration. It thus encompasses not only the EU in the narrow sense (treaties of Maastricht and 
Lisbon), but also the ECC (Treaty of Rome) and the EC (Treaty of Mastricht). 
2 Weale, A., “European environmental policy by stealth: the dysfunctionality of functionalism?”, 17 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (1999); Diez, T. & Wiener, A., Introducing the 
Mosaic of Integration Theory, in Diez, T. & Wiener, A.(eds.), European Integration Theory (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009). 
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functionalism and neo-institutionalism.3 These theories are briefly reviewed 
in the first section of this paper, which also analyzes the rationale behind 
their choice. The second section illustrates the establishment and main 
developments of EU environmental policy, in light of the overarching theme 
of unintended consequences. To this end, section two is divided into three 
main parts covering respectively the first steps of EU environmental policy, 
the change of regulatory paradigm during the 1990s, and the EU leadership 
role in global environmental policy. In this paper, I argue that while neo-
functionalism can give a convincing account of the initial phases of EU 
environmental policy, neo-institutionalism offers a persuasive framework to 
understand the consolidation phases of the policy. In the final section, I sum 
up the main findings and propose some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Theoretical Background: Neo-functionalism and Neo-
Institutionalism 
The choice to refer to neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism in order to 
set the theoretical background of this paper does not intend to overlook the 
fundamental differences between these theories. The first is a grand theory 
aiming to find the causal mechanism that can explain European integration. 
The second is, by contrast, a descriptive theory that wants to emphasize the 
importance of institutions. Both, however, have a role in substantiating the 
argument according to which unintended consequences is the recurrent 
theme of European integration in the field of environmental protection. 
Furthermore, they have been specifically selected for their arguable 
complementarity. Once the logic of spill-over is accepted as a fundamental 
engine of EU integration, neo-institutionalism provides a solid theoretical 
framework to explain why spill-over can hardly be reversed. This is 
particularly useful both to justify the forward-looking mode of integration 
even in times of less EU-enthusiasm and to give a convincing account of the 
development of environmental policy at the EU level. 
First elaborated between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 
1960s by Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, neo-functionalism was specifically 
formulated to analyze the creation of the ECSC and its later evolution.4 This 
theory thus sets the debate on the formation of the EU, since it is one of the 
first attempts to explain the new phenomenon of regional integration in 
Europe. Furthermore, the reasons for its original success lie in its capacity to 
interpret the initial phases of the European project. In this sense, the central 
concept of spill-over is able to give a consistent account of the accelerated 
pace of integration that in less than a decade had led from the creation of a 
European market for coal and steel to the establishment, on the one hand, of 
 
 
3  Note that, in this essay, I will refer to neo-institutionalism mainly as a unitary doctrine, by 
emphasising the elements of the three main kinds of institutionalisms (rational choice, historical, 
and sociological) that are relevant to the present discussion.  
4 Haas, Ernst B., “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing”, 24 International Organization (1970); Diez & Wiener, Introducing the Mosaic…, 45. 
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a legal framework for a common general market in which fundamental 
freedoms are ensured and, on the other hand, of an institutional framework 
with emerging features of supra-nationalism. 
The concept of spill-over lies at the heart of early formulations of the 
theory and refers mainly to the internal interconnectedness of the European 
market and its consequent capacity to incrementally absorb new fields of 
activity. For Haas and Lindberg integration of European states is first and 
foremost a process with an internal dynamic. In the words of Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, who has tremendously contributed to the divulgation of the 
original neo-functionalist propositions, this internal dynamic consists of 
functional, political, and cultivated spill-over.5 First, the term functional 
refers to the fact that, once economic policies are gradually integrated, the 
connections with other sectors are so strong that integration automatically 
extends to them. Second, political spill-over is linked to the pluralistic vision 
of neo-functionalism by Haas and Lindberg. Both authors make reference to 
the prominent role of elites who, with their transboundary interests, are the 
lead actors of integration. In particular, elites are subject to processes of 
social learning and socialization that allow them to shift their allegiance away 
from their national constituencies. Finally, cultivated spill-over implies that 
supranational institutions act to broker agreements between Member States 
that go beyond the threshold of the minimum common denominator, thus 
allowing a shift to decisions taken in view of the common interest. 
While the original formulation of these three dynamics presumed the 
automaticity of spill-over, criticisms (and a substantial demise of the theory) 
following on from the failure of neo-functionalism to explain the empty-chair 
crisis and the stalemate of integration processes from the end of 1960s 
throughout the 1970s led authors like Schmitter and Rosamond to detail the 
conditions under which spill-over can take place, as well as to define 
complementary movements that are able to account for the disintegration 
tendencies of the European integration process.6 In the eyes of Schmitter, 
integration is no longer a linear process, but instead can be described as a 
series of cycles where spill-back, namely “withdrawal from previous 
commitments”7 and disintegration, are one of the possible outcomes. On the 
other hand, spill-over can be the by-product of the dissatisfaction about the 
status quo reached with previous integration. 
Although emerging in the European debate about thirty years later than 
the theorising of neo-functionalism, neo-institutionalism shares with it some 
of its basic assumptions. First, both theories build their arguments on the 
presumed rationality of actors, who seek to maximise their benefits. Second, 
 
 
5 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J., “Neo-functionalism: obstinate or obsolete? A reappraisal in the light of the 
new dynamism of the EC”, 20 Journal of International Studies (1991). 
6 Schmitter, P. C., “Neo-Neofunctionalism”, in Diez & Wiener, European Integration Theory (2004); 
Rosamond, B., “The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies”, 12 Journal of European 
Public Policy (2005). 
7 Niemann & Schmitter, “Neofunctionalism”, in Diez & Wiener, European Integration Theory (2009), 
55. 
Cittadino – The Ascent of EU Environmental Policy 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap  9 edap@eurac.edu 
neo-institutionalism arguably proposes a diluted version of the concept of 
spill-over by highlighting the salience of issue-linkage to understand European 
integration.8 In the eyes of Pierson, the complexity of the European policy-
making arena, which is made of a number of complex policy issues and a 
number of actors, generates dynamics of interaction that are hardly 
controllable by stakeholders. In this view, the expansion of European 
integration may be seen as a by-product of complex institutional mechanisms. 
Finally, both theories emphasize the “significance of supranational actors”,9 
although in this last respect neo-institutionalism does not go so far as to 
theorize the shift of loyalties to the supranational level. 
Notwithstanding these commonalities, neo-institutionalism can be 
regarded, at least in the intentions of some of its most representative 
authors, as a theory that aims to solve the stalemate created by the 
dichotomy between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism.10 
Intergovernmentalism is a theory that seeks to explain European integration 
in overt conflict with the automatism and the supranational character 
emphasised by neo-functionalism. In brief, intergovernmentalism explains 
integration as a product of the exercise of state sovereignty and 
intergovernmental bargains.11 In this respect, neo-institutionalism 
distinguishes itself from neo-functionalism for a renovated interest in State 
actors as opposed to non-governmental elites. Contrary to 
intergovernmentalism, it emphasises the role of supra-national actors in 
putting a brake to Member States’ predominance. 
While acknowledging the role that Member States play in the process of 
European integration, the focus of neo-institutionalism is on the constraints 
imposed on national actors by supranational institutions. To this end, 
institutions are to be intended not only as actors, such as the Commission or 
the European Council, but relate also to the set of rules that regulate the 
interaction of those European actors with the Member States. Garrett and 
Weingast give an account of why institutions are created in the first place, 
highlighting that, while “shared beliefs” and ideas can explain the form of 
the chosen institutions, the need for cooperation is at first a by-product of 
the context of imperfect information in which national actors operate.12 
Institutions, therefore, compensate for the asymmetry of information by 
 
 
8 Pierson, P., “The Path of European Integration. A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, 29 
Comparative Political Studies (1996), 137. 
9 Ibid, 147. 
10 Pollack, M. A., “The New Institutionalism and EU Governance: The Promise and Limits of 
Institutionalist Analysis”, 9 Governance (1996). 
11  Diez & Wiener, Introducing the Mosaic…, 67ff. On intergovernamentalism, see also Hoffmann, S., 
“Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”, 95(3) 
Daedalus, Tradition and Change (1966), 862-915; Moravcsik, A. ‘Preferences and Power in the 
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernamentalist Approach’, 31(4) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, (1993). 
12 Garrett, G. & Weingast, B. R., “Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the European 
Community Internal Market”, in Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy. 
Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Cornell University Press, New York, 1993). 
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acting, on the one hand, as mediators among national actors and, on the 
other hand, as watchdog of supranational commitments. 
One of the common starting points in this strand of literature is that 
institutions, once created, tend to be “sticky”,13 meaning that they cannot be 
easily reformed, thus representing a constraint for Member States’ action. 
This is mainly due to the fact that Member States cannot be fully in control of 
the functioning of institutions for a number of reasons.14 First, institutions are 
specialized bodies created to perform selected functions that require 
expertise. In order for these functions to be correctly addressed, 
supranational bodies are endowed with sufficient powers to perform those 
tasks. This initial delegation of authority creates a margin of manoeuvre for 
the institutions, which in turn results in a certain degree of autonomy from 
the Member States that have originally conceived them.15 This allows 
overtime for an extension of powers from the original set of given 
competences. Second, given the impossibility of regulating every aspect of 
the interaction between Member States (incomplete contract issue), 
supranational bodies receive a mandate that is broader than the tasks 
originally included in their portfolio. This is due to the fact that institutional 
action can face situations where it must fill the “unanticipated 
contingencies” arising during their operation.16 Finally, the so-called “lock-in” 
effect characterises the concept of sticky institutions.17 Institutional 
mechanisms, such as treaty revision barriers, on the one hand, and “sunk 
costs” for those who rely on the system of incentives created by a given 
institutional setting, on the other hand,18 are usually described as the main 
determinants of path dependence. 
The possibility of change, however, is not completely banned in this 
context. Pollack introduces the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” to 
explain that, although institutions are usually resistant to change, they can 
be transformed during critical junctures.19 The possibility of sudden changes 
in the institutional architecture is nonetheless subject to two caveats. First, 
the transformation is still highly dependent on the previous institutional 
arrangements. Second, and as a consequence of the first point, retreating 
from integration is a difficult process. 
 
 
 
13 Pierson, The Path of…, 127; Pollack, Pollack, The New Institutionalism and EU Governance, 438; 
Pollack, M. A., “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration”, in Diez & Wiener, European 
Integration Theory, 143. 
14 Pierson, The Path of…. 
15  Ibid. 
16 Garrett & Weingast, Ideas, Interests…, 181. 
17 Pollack, The New Institutionalism and EU Governance, 432. 
18 Pierson, The Path of…, 144. 
19 Pollack, The New Institutionalism and EU Governance, 439. 
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2.1 Unintended consequences 
Both neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism include in their explanation 
of EU integration the paradigm of unintended consequences. This is present 
in the early formulations of neo-functionalism by Haas,20 who refers to it with 
regards both to short-sighted politicians, unable to foresee the long-term 
consequences of their decisions, and to the creation of new institutions, 
whose full array of functions is often ignored by those who establish them. In 
a nutshell, neo-functionalism uses unintended consequences to explain some 
aspects of the unfolding of the mechanism of spill-over. As explained more in 
detail by Schmitter,21 given the interconnectedness of the tasks performed at 
the EU level, “whatever the initial intentions, there will be a tendency to 
‘spill-over’…and, hence, a…trend toward task expansion in both scope and 
level of authority”. 
The operational mechanism underlying the concept of unintended 
consequences is further specified by neo-institutionalism, especially when it 
comes to the historical declination of this theory. Pierson, by putting the EU 
integration in a long-term perspective, uncovers important “gaps in member-
state control”.22 National negotiators rarely possess the information necessary 
to understand the full implications of their institutional choices. Unintended 
consequences, therefore, become a fundamental paradigm for neo-
institutionalism. As mentioned in the previous section, the autonomy of 
institutions, together with the issue-linkage generated by the interaction of 
states and the creation of common tasks do play a prominent role in this 
respect. Furthermore, the main weakness in member-state control lies 
probably in what is defined as the “high discount rate” to the future23 of 
national actors when negotiating supra-national arrangements. National 
politicians, indeed, are more concerned with the short-term electoral return 
than with the long-term consequences of their decisions. These elements 
translate into a picture of Member States that are constrained by their own 
creature, thus becoming subjected to the unintended consequences of their 
original bargains. 
  
3. The Creation of the EU Environmental Policy 
As of today, EU environmental policy is widely developed and covers issues 
ranging from air quality and water management to climate change and 
sustainable development. Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) lists the environment as one of the shared 
competences between the Union and the Member States. Articles 191 to 193 
 
 
20 Haas, The Study of Regional… . 
21 Schmitter, Neo-neofunctionalism…, 50. 
22 Pierson, The Path of…, 126. 
23 Pierson, The Path of…, 136; Pollack, The New Institutionalism and EU Governance…, 441. 
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set out the main elements of EU environmental policy, ranging from its 
objectives to the legislative procedure applicable when adopting legal acts in 
the field of environmental protection. In light of article 11 TFEU, the 
environment is a transversal policy that should be integrated in the other 
European policies. The improvement of the quality of the environment is also 
included among the Union’s objectives under Article 3 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU). 
The breadth of current environmental legislation and practice is even more 
astounding if one thinks that the EU founding treaties did not mention 
environmental policy among the range of EU objectives and competences. 
This section, therefore, will focus on the process that led to the creation of 
EU environmental policy and its inclusion into the treaties, seeking neither to 
explore the issue of the effectiveness of the selected policy nor to uncover 
the difficulties of its implementation. Rather, the main aim is to show that 
the first steps of EU environmental policy and its subsequent consolidation 
can be read in terms of unintended consequences through the lenses of neo-
functionalism and neo-institutionalism. 
To this end, two decisive phases of the EU environmental policy have been 
selected as particularly telling, namely the initial legislative achievements 
back when the policy had no direct treaty legitimation and the 
transformation of the policy approach in the 1990s. Both developments 
anticipate patterns that are to be considered as general trends of the EU 
environmental policy until today. Finally, special consideration will be given 
in a separate sub-section to the external dimension of EU environmental 
policy. This will complement the analysis with important insights into one of 
the most supranational areas of the EU construction. 
 
3.1 The EU Environmental Policy from Scratch 
In the creation of EU environmental policy three factors emerge as the driving 
forces of this transformation: the functional link between environmental 
protection and the market, the active role of supranational institutions, and 
the perceived low political salience of the policy by national actors. These 
elements are, furthermore, corroborated by the favourable international 
political climate and the responsiveness of EU citizens. The 1960s represent 
the cradle of environmental conscience in the global arena. The awareness of 
environmental problems that extend beyond issues of transboundary damage, 
together with the increasing demand of environmental protection from the 
civil society led the international community to stress new concepts, such as 
the prevention and the precautionary principles, as well as to elaborate new 
paradigms in order to reconcile opposing needs, such as the pursuit of 
economic development and the protection of the environment. This process 
resulted in 1972 in the adoption of the well-known Stockholm Declaration at 
the United Nation Conference on the Human Environment. 
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The first step of the construction of the global environmental governance 
did have a tremendous impact on the European project. 1973 is the year of 
the adoption of the first EU Environmental Action Plan. During the 1970s, in 
addition, an intensive legislative activity took place within the Council that, 
upon proposals of the Commission, adopted more than twenty directives on 
environmental matters.24 But how was this even possible if the treaty was 
silent in the field of environmental protection? 
Directive 70/220 is a case in point when it comes to argue for the 
functional spill-over from economic policy to environmental measures. This 
directive addresses the issue of combating air pollution from motor vehicles 
and was firstly elaborated to avoid that different emission standards could 
create indirect trade barriers to the free circulation of automotive products. 
To this end, directive 70/220, although having an important environmental 
impact, was adopted under article 100 of the ECC Treaty on the 
approximation of national legislations for the creation of the single market.25 
The first environment-related legislative measure taken at the EU level had, 
therefore, an economic rationale and found its legal basis on the single 
market provisions of the Treaty of Rome.26 In this sense, the instrumental use 
of articles 100 and 235 (the so-called ‘flexibility clause’)27 of the ECC Treaty 
allowed initially to guarantee a legal coverage to environmental measures 
based on the presumed linkages with a smooth functioning of the single 
market.28 The creation of environmental legal instruments, however, goes far 
beyond the direct link with the market. The already cited article 235, in fact, 
was used as a legal basis for adopting directives that were not concerned with 
“the operation of the common market” as such. A prominent example of this 
trend is the adoption of the so-called Birds directive (79/409), which creates 
a regime of protection for a number of species of wild birds. 
It needs to be remembered, however, that the spill-over described above 
did not happen automatically. Rather, it was facilitated by purposeful actions 
of the European Commission and of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The 
 
 
24 Lenschow, A., “Environmental Policy”, in Wallace, H. et al. (eds.), Policy-Making in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). 
25  See Jordan, A., “Editorial Introduction: The Construction of a Multilevel Environmental Governance 
System”, 17 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (1999), 7: “Strictly speaking, 
Article 100…was designed to ‘approximate’ pre-existing national provisions…But this did not prevent 
the ECPS [Environment and Consumer Protection Service within DG Industry] submitting proposals 
where no provisions existed in any of the member states.” 
26 Lenschow, Environmental Policy…. 
27  The original text of art. 235 of the Treaty of Rome read as follows: “If action by the Community 
should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council 
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, 
take the appropriate measures.” 
28 Weale, European environmental policy…; Sbragia, A., “Environmental Policy”, in Wallace, Policy-
Making…; Lenschow, Environmental Policy… 
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Court confirmed later in the integration process (during the 1980s and the 
1990s), in several cases, the appropriateness of article 100 as the legal basis 
for EU action in the field of environmental policy.29 In a leading case of 1985 
environmental protection is invoked as one of the “objectives of general 
interest pursued by the Community”.30 The environment, therefore, was 
identified as a sector with an enormous potential in terms of its linkages with 
the market and its possibility to reinforce the all-encompassing attitude of 
supranational actors like the Commission.31 In particular, the protection of 
the environment produced the expansion of EU competences and, thus, of the 
Commission’s powers. The legislative activity of the Commission was, 
moreover, complemented by its lobbying and brokering activity, with the aim 
of “coax[ing] states into accepting deeper integration than they had 
anticipated”.32 
A further step forward was made with the adoption of the Single European 
Act in 1986, which introduced, under article 100A, the qualified majority 
voting rule for harmonization measures, in order to accelerate the realization 
of the Single Market. The SEA also added Title VII to the Rome Treaty, 
whereby a shared competence to legislate, by unanimous vote, on 
environmental matters was granted to the Community. The SEA, thus, 
created a double track whereby market-related provisions in the field of 
environmental protection were to be adopted under the rules of qualified 
majority voting of article 100A, while purely environmental measures were 
subject to the unanimity rule. This resulted in an intense activity of 
legislative initiative on the part of the Commission. The legal proposals were 
usually framed in such a way as to take advantage of the qualified majority 
voting procedure under article 100A. Qualified majority voting also 
substantially tamed individual Member States’ veto powers on legislation, 
encouraging in contrast a different bargaining game whereby so-called green 
states could promote their environmental agenda. As showed by Sbragia, 
what happened especially in the 1980s was that the green states, such as 
Germany and Denmark, pushed for a harmonization of environmental 
standards at the EU level.33 In particular, the main goal was to extend strict 
national environmental rules to all EU Member States, thus preserving the 
competitiveness of national firms. 
States’ perceptions of the political salience of environmental policy are 
central to understanding the initial momentum of environmental legislation. 
One part of the explanation is consistent with a view according to which, 
 
 
29 Jordan, Editorial Introduction…; Sbragia, Environmental Policy…; Lenschow, Environmental Policy…. 
30  See case C-240/83, paras. 12-13. 
31  Although DG ENV came into existence only in 1981, a small unity within DG Industry took the lead in 
preparing legislative proposals in the field of environment. 
32 Jordan, Editorial Introduction…, 5. 
33 Sbragia, Environmental Policy…. 
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given the high technicality of environmental regulations, the new field of 
activity was seen more as a matter to be dealt with by bureaucrats. In this 
sense, environmental proposals were often underestimated by the national 
representatives that voted for them in the Council. In particular, it was 
difficult to foresee the consequences of accepting this new strand of 
legislation in terms of burden-sharing by the Member States. This was due to 
the fact that it was unclear at that time that directives, though establishing 
only a general framework of goals to be reached through the chosen means by 
Member States, can have a direct effect.34 
A more sophisticated explanation, as the example of green states above 
shows, is that some of these legislative proposals were in line with Member 
States’ interests.35 In this respect, three elements explain why the 
environmentally conservative Member States were keen to accept 
environmental standards that would impose on them a greater economic 
burden. First, as contended by Jordan, “complicity between subnational and 
supranational actors” represents one side of the coin.36 According to this 
explanation, the Commission managed to exclude political national actors 
from what it presented as technical decisions to be discussed in specialized 
committees. The other side of the coin, however, concerns the socialization 
process of national environmental ministers and their isolation from national 
political pressures.37 The third aspect is, finally, related to the procedural 
mechanisms in place, including the qualified majority voting allowing for the 
green states to make their proposals little negotiable. 
Hence, the first steps of EU environmental policy evoke neo-functionalist 
reasoning in many respects. The central concepts of spill-over and issue-
linkage perfectly describe the rationale behind the creation of the policy 
stemming from the process of economic integration. It was clear from the 
beginning, however, that the relationship between the market and 
environmental protection was dual in that, while market considerations were 
invoked to develop the first environmental measures, “environmental policy 
became a central element in the evolution of the EC/EU into something 
‘more than a market’”.38 Furthermore, it is in the technical nature of 
environmental regulation that supranational actors such as the Commission 
saw the potential not only for creating a new competence field for the EU, 
but also for constructing a new “focal point”— a pool of shared ideas and 
 
 
34  Jordan, Editorial Introduction….The direct effect doctrine was developed by the ECJ with regards to 
directives pretty soon during the 1970s. The liability of States for not implementing the obligations 
contained in the directives appeared for the first time in the 1991 with the Francovich judgment 
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37 Sbragia, Environmental Policy…; Lenschow, Environmental Policy…. 
38 Lenschow, A. & Sprungk, C., “The Myth of a Green Europe”, 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 
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objectives39 – around which the allegiances of Member States can be possibly 
re-oriented. The environment would constitute an important ideational factor 
in the construction of European integration. In this respect, the active role of 
EU supranational institutions can be interpreted both in terms of the concept 
of cultivated spill-over and with reference to an attempt of the Commission 
to accrue its powers. This, in turn, can be seen in light of neo-institutionalism 
as a constraint to Member States’ action that derives from the autonomy of 
institutions. In addition, the attitude of national actors towards the new-born 
policy fits particularly well with the explanation of unintended consequences 
as framed both by neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism. Finally, the 
repeated interaction of national actors in the EU fora is in line with Checkel’s 
argument that institutions shape the identities of the actors that operate 
within their settings.40 
In light of the institutional interplay illustrated above, the codification of 
environmental policy in the Single European Act in 198641, although 
representing a significant symbolic recognition of the EU’s competence to act 
in the field, adds little to the pattern of institutional practices consolidated 
through the mechanism of qualified majority voting. Nor did relevant changes 
come from the official extension of the qualified majority voting rule to 
environmental legislation introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The 
new change of paradigm, as it will be argued in the following sub-section, did 
not come from the institutional settings consolidated in the first years of the 
policy. Rather, it was the result of a considerable change in the regulatory 
approach of the EU environmental legislation. 
 
3.2 The 1990s: From Command-and-Control to Economic 
Instruments 
The first wave of environmental legislation until the 1990s was characterized 
by a regulatory approach known as command-and-control for the stringent 
requirements imposed on Member States. Germany was the main initiator of 
this approach, backing the Commission in the elaboration of very detailed 
regulations that set standards to be achieved individually by Member States 
and imposed penalties on those States that were not able to meet the 
required standards.42 The typical measures wished to control emission of 
pollutants in the air and water, in line with an approach that was centred on 
 
 
39 Garrett & Weingast, Ideas, Interests…. 
40 Checkel, J., “Social Construction and Integration”, 6 Journal of European Public Policy (1999). 
41  The Single European Act added Articles 130r, 130s and 130t to the EEC Treaty, 
42 Sbragia, Environmental Policy…; Alberton, M. & Palermo, F., Environmental Protection in Multi-
Layered Systems: Comparative Lessons from the Water Sector (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden; Boston, 
2012). 
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the natural means to be protected.43 This approach implied for the 
Commission a duty to patrol the respect for the standards at national level. 
At the same time, it ensured to countries like Germany that the stringent 
emission limits would not represent a cost for German firms alone, but would 
apply equally to European firms and not distort competition. 
This approach was presumably in line with the Commission’s will to be fully 
in control of the new policy area. However, it became soon target of 
criticism. With the new economic crisis of the 1990s, the command-and-
control approach was suddenly called into question. The main argument was 
that the chosen regulatory approach was too expensive and imposed on States 
a heavy interference on their national systems. A new call for subsidiarity and 
flexibility emerged at that time: national and local actors should become 
more prominent in the elaboration of environmental legislation, States should 
be given a greater margin of manoeuvre as to attain the environmental 
objectives agreed at EU level.44 The Commission was highly responsive to the 
concerns expressed by Member States and sub-national actors. It reinvented 
the wheel with three main changes: the introduction of market-based 
instruments that created a system of economic incentives and disincentives 
to influence the actions of private actors, an extensive use of Green papers 
before legislation to encourage public debate and ensure more transparency, 
and the recourse to less harmonized standards for environmental objectives 
to be reached without substantive changes at national level. 
To explain this change of paradigm in the regulatory approach promoted by 
the Commission, one needs to acknowledge the relationship of mutual 
influence existing between the Commission and Member States when it comes 
to the direction of EU environmental policy. As claimed by Weale,45 the 
Commission fine-tunes its proposals depending on Member States’ preferences 
and winning coalition in the Council. Lenschow shares this view when he 
contends that the Commission is “responsive to … [Member States’] demands 
of legislation”.46 These arguments, far from being supportive of an 
intergovernmental interpretation of European integration, add up an element 
of Realpolitik to the movement of cultivated spill-over described in section 1. 
When pushing for integration, the Commission must shape its proposals so as 
to satisfy Member States’ concerns. This does not equate to say that the 
Commission’s agenda is determined by national actors. Instead, it points to 
the fact that the Commission must act strategically to pursue its own 
integration goals. To this end, it must intercept Member States’ preferences 
and elaborate proposals that can meet the majority voting requirements in 
the Council. 
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This argument fits particularly well with the need to explain the passage 
from the command-and-control approach, firmly wanted by Germany in the 
first place, to the promotion of market-based instruments that were more in 
line with the regulatory culture of the UK.47 As argued by Lenschow, Member 
States “liked to be on the initiating side in order to keep down the costs of 
any subsequent adaptation”.48 Therefore, the Commission took advantage 
both of this competition among Member States and of the changing alliances 
in the Council. 
Although some authors49 look at the 1990s as a substantive demise of EU 
environmental policy due to the changing nature of the instruments 
employed, my argument is instead that a retreat from environmental 
obligations simply did not happen. In the 1990s, on the contrary, 
environmental policy was “one of the fastest growing areas of the EU” and 
“regulation show[ed] no sign of being totally eclipsed by alternative tools”.50 
In the words of Lenschow, it was precisely in those years that “processes of 
gradual institutionalization moved environmental policy principles from the 
status of programmatic statements into a formal acquis and finally into 
prominent treaty provisions. This prevent[ed] a rolling back even at times of 
little political enthusiasm.”51 Suffices to think of the conspicuous case law of 
the ECJ in the 1990s.52 A topical example of the “comunitarisation” of 
environmental law is the decision in France v. Commission (C-41/93), where 
the Court clarifies that deviations from the harmonised rules should be 
notified to the Commission that must give its reasoned approval to the 
exceptions applied at the Member State level. This decision is relevant since 
it regarded a more restrictive – more environmental friendly - regime on the 
use of pentachlorophenol (PCP) applied by Germany in contradiction with the 
European directive Directive 91/173. Another important case that confirms 
the thesis of an environmental acquis is the decision in the case C-435/97 
regarding the use of the Bolzano airport for commercial purposes53. The 
project of renovation had not been accompanied by a full environmental 
impact assessment as required by directive 85/377. Italian authorities, on the 
contrary, planned to apply an ad hoc assessment procedure. The Court 
clarified that a Member State cannot undermine the attainment of a 
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49 Pallemaerts, M., “The decline of law as instrument of Community environmental policy”, 3 Revue 
des Affaires Européennes (1999); Hey, C., “EU Environmental Policies: A short history of the policy 
strategies”, in Scheuer, S. (ed.), EU Environmental Policy Handbook: A Critical Analysis of EU 
Environmental Legislation (European Environmental Bureau, Brussels, 2005). 
50 Jordan, Editorial Introduction…, 12, 15. 
51  Lenschow, Environmental Policy…, 324 (emphasis added). 
52  On this, see Krämer L., Casebook on EU Environmental Law (Hart Publishing, 2002). 
53  World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Others v. Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others, Judgment of 16 
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directive’s objective by applying an alternative regime when the case at hand 
would instead require the application of European rules. Further, when a 
Member State’s authorities exceed their discretion by the misapplication of a 
directive, individuals can invoke the directive’s rules before a national 
tribunal (direct effect of environmental directives). 
As a consequence of this line of reasoning, and given the unwillingness of 
numerous Member States to accept new environmental obligations, the surge 
of environmental policy in the 1990s can be interpreted as the unintended 
result of previous integration. Member States were locked-in by the 
consolidation of the former acquis, in the form of the competence of the EU 
enshrined in the Treaties. By the same token, the strategy of the Commission 
of giving a voice to Member States’ preferences can be seen as a way to 
counter the mounting dissent among national actors wishing to retreat from 
environmental commitments, thus leaving the importance of environmental 
policy unharmed.54 
 
3.3 EU Leadership in Global Environmental Governance 
A substantial part of EU environmental legislation is derived from the 
transposition of international multilateral agreements.55 While the influence 
of international law could alone justify the need to give account of this 
aspect of EU environmental policy, what is even more interesting is the 
reverse side of the coin. The EU has influenced global environmental 
governance, imposing itself as a global environmental leader.56 This section, 
therefore, seeks to explore to what extent EU international leadership in 
environmental matters has had an impact both on the institutional settings of 
EU environmental policy at home and, in a broader perspective, on 
international environmental governance. What will emerge is that internal 
and external dimensions are mutually intertwined when it comes to EU 
environmental governance. In other words, international developments are 
both the engine of transformations in the EU environmental policy and the 
result of the exercise of EU policy leadership. This interpretation, in turn, is 
in line with the unintended consequences paradigm in that decisions and 
procedures that were conceived to be applied in the exercise of EU external 
action in environmental matters have produced effects on environmental 
policy at the EU level. Plus, commitments at the international level have 
constrained EU environmental policy at home. 
Before discussing specific empirical evidence, it is worth clarifying how the 
EU justified its external competence in environmental matters. This can be 
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traced back to the ECJ ERTA case (C-22/70 of 1971), where the Court first 
developed its implied power doctrine related to external competences of the 
EU.57 According to this doctrine, “each time the Community, with a view to 
implementing a common policy envisaged by the treaty, adopts provisions 
laying down common rules…the member states no longer have the right, 
acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with third 
countries which affect those rules or alter their scope”. Therefore, each time 
the EU acts internally in one of its fields of competence, it pre-empts the 
right of its Member States of exercising those competences at international 
level. This amounted to an extension of the functions attributed to the EU, 
whose field of action included the external dimension of internal 
competences. This doctrine has been further extended (ECJ Opinion 1/76 of 
1977) to imply that if there exists a competence in the Treaties to act 
internally to achieve certain objectives and if these objectives cannot 
sufficiently be achieved by internal action, the EU can enter into 
international agreements in order to ensure the attainment of these goals.58 
The case of environmental policy, however, is not one in which the action 
of the EU prevents Member States from acting. Instead, as a result of a 
refinement of the doctrine by the ECJ which distinguished among different 
categories of external implied powers,59 environmental policy is included 
among those external competences that are shared between the EU and its 
Member States. This mixed competence opens the door to so-called mixed 
agreements, where the EU is a signatory to the most prominent multilateral 
environmental agreements together with its Member States.60 This innovative 
institutional configuration has been facilitated by the development of some 
institutional tools, such as “prenegotiation positions, active involvement at 
the actual international negotiations, and the conclusion of postnegotiation 
agreements”.61 Member States agree on common positions in Council meetings 
or in ad-hoc institutional settings. They, therefore, negotiate multilateral 
agreements by using a single voice. This mechanism is then reinforced by the 
participation of EU representatives to the negotiations. This entails that 
Member States’ positions in international negotiations are hardly independent 
from that of the EU. The commonly agreed obligations are finally 
implemented in a coordinated way due to post-negotiation agreements 
operated at EU level, often in the form of Council resolutions that assign 
duties to the single Member States. This institutional set-up, therefore, 
creates numerous constraints to the ability of Member States to pursue their 
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own environmental agenda at the international level. This is therefore an 
example of an institutional arrangement that has been created to reinforce 
EU’s bargaining power at the international level and that ends up determining 
a constraint on individual Member States’ action (lock-in effect). 
The implied external powers doctrine, moreover, entailed far-reaching 
consequences also for the global environmental governance. In this latter 
respect, Lenschow argues that, “as international conventions are usually 
formal agreements between sovereign states…, this process [the EU being 
involved in international negotiations] involved the establishment of new 
procedures.”62 The most problematic issue was, in fact, to recognize that the 
EU could be entitled to enter into international agreements, given that the 
question of the legal personality of the EU was far from being settled.63 An 
example of this difficulty was the refusal of the Conference of the Parties of 
the CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora) to accept the EU accession to the Convention. In the view of 
some authors,64 however, the rejection of the EU as a contracting party was 
hardly linked to the legal uncertainty over its personality. Rather, the main 
factor was the lack of political pressure on the part of the EU due to a scarce 
politicisation of the issue. The trade in endangered species was so 
uninfluential for the establishment of the single market or for the process of 
integration more generally that the EU did not bother to insist. 
This is certainly not the case for the negotiations of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Here, the interests at stake were 
manifold and equally intertwined with the EU integration process. Tackling 
climate change, in fact, implies a change in the production and consumption 
patterns of national actors. This means that if the EU had not entered with a 
prominent role in the negotiation process, it would have most probably had a 
hard time in keeping control on issues like industrial production, transport, 
energy, agriculture, and ultimately the internal market itself (issue-linkage). 
It is little surprising that the EU assumed a leadership role in the development 
of the international regime on climate change. From an institutional 
perspective, the EU not only made use of the instruments developed in 
previous multilateral negotiations (Vienna Convention on the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol), but it secured an increased level 
of lock-in by consolidating the three elements that were mentioned above as 
characterizing the EU institutional set-up in global environmental 
governance, namely the pre-negotiation agreements, the direct participation 
of EU representatives in the negotiation process, and the post-negotiation 
agreements. In the words of Sbragia, “the demands of negotiating 
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UNFCCC…led the EU to innovate in its policy-making process…ministers met to 
draw up a Community position”.65 In the case of climate change, however, 
the innovation is not only procedural, but also substantial. It suffices to think 
of the burden-sharing agreement reached among the EU Member States. This 
has allowed the EU to negotiate a single CO2 reduction target at the 
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC, calculated as an average 
value of the reduction obligations individually imposed on the Member States. 
Given this framework, the EU is collectively responsible towards the other 
contracting parties about reaching a common target.66 At the level of the EU, 
instead, the Union differentiates among the obligations of the individual 
Member States.67 The fact that the EU presented itself as a single actor in the 
global arena and the acceptance of substantial reduction obligations have 
been seen as one of the main factors explaining the success of the Kyoto 
negotiations. This means that Europe has been able to foster a powerful 
international agreement in a sector that overlaps, and sometimes collides, 
with important prerogatives of state sovereignty. This innovative result would 
have never been possible if international negotiations were conducted by 
Member States in their personal capacity. 
Why was the EU willing to acquire this leadership position in the first 
place? Oberthür and Roche Kelly argue for two central reasons with reference 
to the EU climate change policy that can be, however, extended to explain 
more generally the EU external leadership in environmental matters.68 First, 
this leadership fosters legitimacy of European institutions in the eyes of 
European citizens, who are demanding more environmental protection. 
Hence, it becomes an indirect driver of European integration. Second, it 
contributes to reinforce more generally the EU position as a global actor in 
the international arena. This means that the EU can enjoy an initiator 
advantage that allows for a protection of its fundamental interests and 
values. 
What emerges, in conclusion, is a framework where Member States are 
willing to step back in international environmental negotiations. This can be 
explained to a great extent through the reference to the institutional 
mechanisms that have been illustrated above. Member States, therefore, are 
locked-in in the implementation of targets that are not solely negotiated by 
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them but are mediated by the EU. As clarified above, this has both 
procedural (negotiation arrangements) and substantive effects (targets). 
Notwithstanding the powerful internal lock-in effect (of the EU on its national 
units), it is highly unlikely that the EU could ensure a comparable lock-in 
effect on its international partners, as demonstrated by the failure of 
reaching a post-Kyoto agreement. The leadership role in the international 
arena, in fact, is nothing to be taken for granted. Instead, it is an element 
that needs to be secured at each and every negotiation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this essay, I showed that the evolution and consolidation of EU 
environmental policy can be read in light of the paradigm of unintended 
consequences, as framed by neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism. In 
the first part, the neo-functionalist logic of spill-over has proved highly 
enlightening as far as the first developments of the selected policy are 
concerned. The lack of explicit reference to environmental competence has 
not prevented the adoption of a series of environmental regulations, which in 
turn have contributed to consolidate an acquis in this field. This was no 
automatic process and it required, instead, the active commitment of 
supranational actors, such as the Commission. The Council, from its side, 
contributed to the sustained growth of the policy, also due to the not entirely 
predictable impact of this new strand of legislation on the national 
constituencies. Two elements can, therefore, be identified here, namely the 
logic of functional and cultivated spill-over, and the influence of unintended 
consequences. 
In the second section, I described the delicate passage from the so-called 
command-and-control approach to the adoption of market-based instruments. 
This passage is piloted once again by the Commission that decided to respond 
to the increasing demand of states and sub-national actors for more flexibility 
and subsidiarity. This change, however, has not triggered a rolling-back of 
integration in the field of environmental policy, since the acquis had 
developed to such an extent that retreating from integration was not an 
option. The element of unintended consequences, therefore, can be read 
here in terms of the lock-in effect theorized by neo-institutionalism. 
Finally, in the third section, I argued that the expansion of environmental 
policy derives also from the will of the EU to act as a global environmental 
leader. To this end, the EU has developed sophisticated institutional 
mechanisms that constrain Member States’ action in the environmental field 
even in the international arena. This has been particularly evident in the 
negotiations of the multilateral climate change regime. In this last respect, 
the EU commitment to fight against climate change, demonstrated by the 
collective reduction target negotiated by the EU as a whole, brokered a very 
ambitious deal in Kyoto. Unintended consequences in the form of institutional 
constraints, thus, are also able to explain the activism of the EU at 
international level. 
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To the framework outlined above, however, I would like to add some final 
remarks. The first one concerns the role of institutions. In this essay, I 
decided to omit the greening role of the European Parliament. This is mainly 
due to the fact that, when the policy was first created in the 1970s, the role 
of the European Parliament was not so developed as to influence either the 
content or the institutional settings of the policy itself. Moreover, the aim of 
this essay was not to investigate the issue of the legitimacy of environmental 
policy. Rather, the analysis was focused on the institutional balance that has 
allowed the policy to initially develop and consolidate. Instead, if one takes 
into account the incremental role of the European Parliament in the 
legislative process, what can be observed is a greener attitude of the 
legislation adopted,69 rather than a clear impact on the level of integration of 
the policy. 
The second remark I would like to make concerns the internal evolution of 
the policy. From what I have shown in this essay there is a clear evolution 
from the integration of technical aspects experienced in the first phases of 
the policy to a more decisive leaning towards issues that involve a change in 
the patterns of production/consumption of Member States, such as the fight 
against climate change. A radical change of the industrial paradigm of 
Member States should allow to reconsider the “technocratic bias of the 
European Union”70 in favour of a remarkable tendency of the EU to deal with 
highly political issues. The evolution of EU environmental policy, therefore, 
can be also read in terms of an internal spill-over. In other words, the 
Monnet’s method of incremental steps can be seen as an internal dynamic of 
EU environmental policy that has evolved from technical instruments and 
piecemeal legislation to more political issues and integrated/holistic 
approach. 
Are there elements of EU environmental policy, however, that cannot be 
accommodated by neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism? Although this 
question is too broad to be addressed here, I would like to put forward a last 
argument so as to demonstrate that the framework I traced in this essay holds 
even when it is apparently not the case. The ongoing economic crisis, for 
instance, could be seen as a critical juncture that would eventually disrupt 
the institutional constraints developed until now, even in fields that go 
beyond EU environmental policy. What is relevant here is that critical 
junctures are theorized both by neo-functionalists (it suffices to think of the 
spill-back à la Schmitter)71 and by neo-institutionalists.72 From an empirical 
perspective, moreover, the figures of the new financial framework 2014-2020 
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show that EU environmental policy still holds its grip.73 The main conclusion 
that can be drawn from the present analysis is that, although EU 
environmental instruments have changed, the policy has dramatically gained 
in importance. As it has been shown in this essay, this is the result of a 
number of elements that can be explained in terms of unintended 
consequences, as framed by neo-functionalism and neo-institutionalism.
 
 
73 The provisional Multiannual Financial Framework indicates that the budget for environmental 
programmes is still substantial, with a particular focus on climate change actions and on 
mainstreaming environmental policy into the other policy sectors. The 2020 strategy (with its 
objectives of reducing the green-house gas emissions, increasing energy efficiency, and increasing 
the share of energy production from renewables by 20% by 2020), moreover, will guide policy action 
for the next decade. 
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